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The study investigates the efficiency effect of affiliation with the two strongest 
associations in Czech agriculture. These represent large-scale enterprises and individual 
farmers, respectively. The efficiency analysis is supplemented by analyses of incentives for 
associations’ membership and farm characteristics decisive for membership choice. The 
results imply that political lobbying is the main entry incentive. Commercially-oriented 
individual farms which employ external workers are more likely to choose association 
membership, as are agricultural enterprises that specialize in livestock production or preserve 
a high share of employee ownership. We find that association membership has a significant 
positive impact on farms’ performance, especially among individual farms. Non-members 
represent a more heterogeneous group. Nevertheless, the best non-members are able to 
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the socialist period in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), only 
associations that were linked to the regime were permitted. The main objective of these type 
of associations were the dissipation of the communist idea and support of the government 
policy. Consequently, independent businesses and business associations which could express 
their collective interests did not exist (McMenamin 2001). With political reform, the 
conditions for associations’ development began to evolve. Therefore, transition countries 
provide a unique opportunity to study not only the evolution of business associations in their 
“childhood” stage, but also their functioning and effects on sectors and firms' performance. 
 
The associations’ emergence and their role in the transition process has been 
described in several politic science studies (Olson 1997, Brokl 1997) which emphasize the 
relevant role of associations in building democracy as they intermediate between the voters 
and the government. The studies find that the creation and development of associations is 
hindered by weak civic society in Central and Eastern Europe as a heritage of decades of 
totalitarianism. Sociologists see the reason for weak civil society in the lack of social capital 
in CEECs, which has also contributed to their disappointingly slow transition process (Paldam 
and Svedsen 2000, Raiser et al., 2001). Relatively few studies have evaluated the impact of 
affiliation with slowly emerging associations on firms’ performance in CEECs. Wolz et al., 
(2002) deals implicitly with associations' efficiency effect where they analyze the efficiency 
effect of social capital in Poland by defining social capital as firms’ willingness to participate 
in various types of organizations and interest groups. They conclude that membership in these 
organizations and groups significantly influences the farms’ gross revenues. A few other 
studies evaluate the business groups' affiliation impact on firms’ performance in other 
emerging economies (e.g. Keister 1998, Khanna and Rivkin 2001). These studies found 
ambiguous results regarding the performance effect of business group affiliation. There were 
significant differences between analyzed countries, which the authors suggested exist due to 
variations in the countries’ institutional conditions.  
 
However, institutional conditions can also vary for agents in one country and one 
industry; this is often associated with differences in interests and needs for business groups 
development. This can be especially true for transition countries where newly emerging 
businesses often compete with historical agents who preserved their important role and 
networks in some industries. Czech agriculture, with its dual farm structure and competing 
agricultural associations, is a unique subject for analyzing evolving business groups which 
respond to market or policy failures arising in the particular institutional context of emerging 
economies, and where transaction cost reduction can have a significant effect on farms’ 
performance. There are two strong interest factions in Czech agriculture; the Agricultural 
Association, with strong historical ties and which represents mostly large-scale agricultural 
enterprises, and the Association of Private Farming, which represents individual farms. The 
main objective of this study is to investigate the efficiency effect of affiliation with these two 
competing and, incidentally, strongest agricultural associations. We use stochastic frontier 
analysis on survey and accountancy data for the years 2001 to 2003 to obtain technical 
efficiency measures and to identify the associations’ role. We complete and facilitate the 
analysis through survey results on incentives for associations’ membership and an analysis of 
farms' characteristics thought to be decisive for choosing membership. 
 
The following section provides a theoretical discussion on the possible positive and 
negative effects of business group affiliation on firm performance. A short description of the 
evolution and resources of the two strongest Czech agricultural associations is included in 
section 3. Section 4 describes the used data and defines variables. The applied methodology is 
discussed in section 5. Section 6 provides survey results of incentives for association 
membership, results from a qualitative response model on membership choice, and stochastic 
frontier production function results of associations efficiency effect. Section 7 summarizes 
and concludes. 
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Despite the earlier studies' failure to reach a common definition of “groups”, there is 
no doubt that associations fit into the theoretical concept of business groups. A business group 
can be defined as “a long-term association of a great diversity of firms and the men who own 
and manage these firms” (Leff 1978: 663) or “a set of firms which, though legally 
independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are 
accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin 2001: 48). As earlier field 
research suggests, the group members are “linked by relations of interpersonal trust, on the 
basis of a similar personal, ethic or commercial background” (Leff 1978: 663). 
   
The existence of business groups is assumed to be rationally motivated, hence a 
positive effect on members' performance could be expected. The present arguments over the 
business groups’ economic performance effect have their basis in various theoretical 
approaches such as new political economics, transaction cost economics, or the theory of 
social capital; the arguments, however, offer predictions in various ways. The effect naturally 
relates to what the group does, to how many resources it has at hand, and how many voids left 
by the missing institutions it can fill. It all comes down to how costly membership is 
compared to the associated benefits. In this part, we concentrate on the performance effect of 
what the business group does in generally imperfect institutional settings. 
 
One of the important business group functions is coordinated political lobbying. As 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) argue, this is a special case of group response to “market failure”. 
Access to political power is especially important where government authorities play a large 
and less-than-even-handed role in the economy, as they do in many transition economies. We 
can see the effect of lobbying activities especially significantly in the agricultural sector, 
where receiving political support can be associated with better access to agricultural subsidies 
or favorable market intervention. For successful lobbying of an association, possessing special 
information which is not only costly to acquire but which the government also wants for 
policy formation is crucial. Policy actors then exchange this information (as well as the 
political support from the association) for the possibility of influencing policy formation. 
Association members can, in general, through investment into relationships with political 
agents, gain superior access to the political power structure and hence draw from a richer pool 
of opportunities. However, gaining political power does not have to be motivated merely by 
economic concerns. Sociologist have suggested that political power can be, similar to 
institutional legitimacy and social fitness motivations, itself (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
equally important to economic gains. In this case, members could invest into gaining political 
power over and above what the benefits of this action could be. Another aspect of political 
lobbying is that it results in predominantly public goods, which can become a subject to free-
riding
2 by non-members. Free riders in general increase the cost of the group's collective 
activity (Olson 1965), thus the business group's success depends on the degree to which it is 
able to solve the free-riding problem. The objective of the group is to win more members, 
which lowers the average costs of membership since rational agents decide on group 
membership based on the comparison of expected marginal costs (member’s fees, invested 
time, etc.) and expected marginal returns from group affiliation. Expected marginal returns 
have to be at least equal to the expected marginal costs. Therefore, the group performance 
further relies on a provision of selective incentives accessible to the group members only.  
 
The importance of selective incentives for overcoming the free rider problem, and 
thus for groups' political influence and success was recognized by Olson (1965) in his work 
titled “The Logic of Collective Action”. The activities which belong to this group of 
incentives are, for example, advisory and consultancy activities, formal and informal 
information exchanges, joint training of skilled managers, raising capital jointly, or pooling 
resources to invest in new ventures. These activities can be most efficient when shaped in 
response to market failures that would lower associated transaction costs the most. A group 
  3can overcome problems in input and product markets by trading internally, where the 
economic and social punishment for opportunistic behavior can be severe. Also, the increase 
of a member's reputation could facilitate access to capital and other resources, especially 
where formal contracting has not yet fully developed, or where contract enforcement is less 
certain due to poor legislation. But without the transitional context, Ingram and Simons (2002) 
argue, a group's co-membership improves opportunities and motivations for transferring 
experience and the capacity for organizations to successfully apply the experience of others. 
Experience accumulated in one organization group strengthens the competitiveness of its 
members. 
 
The last considered aspect which can positively influence group members’ 
performance is the group’s contribution to the members’ social ties. In Coleman’s (1988) 
sense, the relationships which emerge between members contribute to the enhancement of 
social capital. A significant part of social capital is trust. Various social sciences studies 
conclude that trust in inter-firm relationships improves business performance (Lane and 
Bachmann 1996, Knack and Keefer 1997). Trust is linked with boosting stability and the 
limitation of uncertainties about the future behavior of exchange partners (Lane 1996). The 
economic functions of such social ties, regardless of the reason for their origin, is consistent 
with those emphasized by transaction costs economics. Social ties can be conceptualized as 
mechanisms through which intra-group transaction costs are lowered by encouraging 
information dissemination among group firms, reducing the possibility of contractual 
disputes, and providing low-cost mechanisms for dispute resolution (Khanna and Rivkin 
2001).   
 
However, as mentioned above, the literature also offers arguments that group 
affiliation need not always be beneficial. Inefficient groups can exist under poorly-developed 
selection environments, where weak organizational forms are not weeded out (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997). Group affiliation may be costly if it undertakes certain central, expensive 
actions that may or may not be beneficial. For example, training programs may be too costly if 
the training needs of group members are largely heterogeneous. Groups could also support 
inefficiency since members may be obliged or be prone to purchase inputs or to cooperate 
with other sibling firms, efficient or not (Williamson 1975). As mentioned earlier, groups 
could also include firms whose decisions are mostly driven by considerations other than local 
economic gains. The group's social ties and modest selection pressures can keep firms tied to 
their groups despite its inefficiency. The discussion of the business groups performance effect 
suggests that only empirical research will resolve whether the benefits of group affiliation 
usually outweigh the costs or vice versa. 
 
 
3  CZECH AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
 
The two most represented associations in Czech Agriculture are the Agrarian 
Association, which mostly represents the interests of large-scale farms, and the Association of 
Private Farming, which is geared toward individual farmers. In this section, we consider these 
associations’ development, activities and interests which they represent, as well as their 
membership dimensions and resources. All these aspects significantly distinguish the two 
business factions. Their brief description should contribute to the comprehension of the 
associations' effect on members’ performance later in the study. 
 
 
3.1  Agricultural Association 
 
 
The Agrarian Association of the Czech Republic (AA) was founded in 2001 as the 
successor to the Association of Co-operative Farming, whose roots go back to the socialist 
era. The predominant role of this association during socialism was the promotion of 
governmental politics among the farmers. In the early 1990s, this organization was the only 
  4one in Czech agriculture. During the 1990s the association was transformed several times (see 
Bavorová 2004). The association tried to influence agricultural policy through cooperation 
with political institutions and the ministry apparatus, as well as through political lobbying in 
the parliament. During that time, their effort were not very successful, and important decisions 
such as laws on land property rights restitution and the creation of the Market Regulation 
Fund were not influenced by AA lobbying (Kříž 1995). Affiliation with the Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSDP), which began in1996, helped to represent the association's interests 
in the political field. At that time, Social Democrat Jan Fencl was the chair of the Association. 
The association's influence strengthened after the CSDP won the 1998 election and Mr Fencl 
became the Minister of Agriculture. In addition, and importantly for its political impact, AA 
participated in the social partnership body, the so-called Tripartite. 
 
In 2004, AA members cultivated 1,349,000 ha of agricultural area, which represents 
37% of the total agricultural area in the Czech Republic (www.zemsvazpraha.cz). The 
association has about 1,000 members; half of them are co-operatives, approximately one-third 
are joint-stock companies and around 15 % limited liability companies. Few members had 
other legal status. Seventy-three percent of all co-operative farms, 52% of all joint-stock 
companies and 9% of the limited-liability companies in the Czech Republic are members of 
the AA. The share of actual to potential members can be used as an indirect measure of the 
free riding problem (Potters and Sloof 1996), which is, in the case of AA, relatively small. 
 
The AA has comparatively good labor resources. The AA's central office in Prague 
employs 10 persons while each of the 48 regional offices employs 1 or 2 persons. The labor 
recourses enable the association to collect and prepare high quality information about their 
members for deputies and politicians. Information on AA member farms is collected through a 
competition titled “the best farm of the year”. The annual budget of the association is 
approximately 20 million Czech Crowns (all flows included). The financing of the association 
consists of member fees (20 % of a budget) and gains from their own economic activities such 
as organizing workshops for the Ministry of Agriculture, provisions from facilitating 
relationships between farmers and input suppliers, and from AA-owned building rentals. For 
their members, the association provides an information service mostly by Internet (e.g. daily 
information on price developments) advisory activities and facilitates contracts between 
agricultural producers and suppliers. 
 
 
3.2  Association of Private Farming 
 
 
The Association of Private Farming of the Czech Republic (APF) was established in 
1999 through the integration of three small associations with similar interests. The main task 
of the APF is defending the economic, social and professional interests of the individual 
farmers at home as well as abroad. The activities stem from respect for family farming 
traditions and the belief in the perspective of family farms as an important part of modern 
agriculture and the developed countryside. The APF is a non-party organization with a strong 
entrepreneurship and conservative orientation, and with ties to the right-wing Civic 
Democratic Party (CDP). During the time when the CDP led the government and the CSDP 
opposed, the association enforced its interests in Chamber of Deputies through cooperation 
with the ODS deputies.  
 
The APF members covered around 300,000 ha of agricultural area in 2003, which 
corresponds with 7% of the total agricultural land. It represented approximately one third of 
the area cultivated by individual farmers. The association has about 3,100 members, which 
means that the average cultivated area per member farmer is approximately 100 ha, a number 
far above the average land size of an individual farm. However, many small individual 
farmers are not even registered in the “Agricultural Register” as producing food. The number 
of individual farmers who are registered in the “Agricultural Register” and who can thus be 
considered as market-oriented farmers,  exceeds the number of APF members by ten times. 
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corporate farms. 
 
In comparison to AA, APF has significantly lower labor resources. The central office 
of APF in Prague employs 4 persons, and each of the 40 regional offices 1 or 2 persons. 
Volunteers' contributions are very important for APS work. The financial sources come from 
membership fees and economic activities such as organizing excursions and holidays around 
Europe, or publication activities. The annual budget has reached approximately 2 to 3 million 
Czech Crowns (not all flows included). The APF carries out a project (among others) called 
“Czech farm,” which aims to lower input prices for farmers. The association organizes a 
competition titled “best individual farms of the year”, which serves as an information source 
for the association, as well as for the government. The APF provides information to its 
members in a bulletin form once every 1-2 months, as well as on Internet (www.asz.cz ).  
 
 
4  DATA DESCRIPTION  
 
 
The data set available for the analysis consists of (a) data on 163 agricultural 
enterprises (legal entities) and 62 individual farms from an extensive survey conducted by the 
Institute for Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) and by the 
Research Institute for Agricultural Economics in Prague (VUZE) in the Czech Republic 
during 2004, and (b) farm accountancy data for the identical enterprises and farms for the 
years 2001 to 2003 collected by VUZE. The firms in the sample are classified mostly as farms 
with combined crop and animal production. The agricultural enterprises have various legal 
forms – limited companies, joint stock companies, and cooperatives. Despite the fact that legal 
entities are large scale farms, the agricultural enterprises in the sample vary significantly in 
size. The individual farms are also very heterogeneous in their size, even if farms cultivating 
less than 10 hectares were excluded form the survey.  
 
The survey provided information on the farms’ association membership, motivations 
for membership, and also a number of farms and farmers’ (managers’) characteristics, which 
will be analyzed in the context of association membership choice. These variables partially 
differ among the two groups of enterprises since they are significantly heterogeneous in their 
ownership and managerial structures. The analyzed characteristics of agricultural enterprises 
are: membership in AA (ASSOC1MEM), the legal form as a dummy variable indicating the 
form of cooperative (COOPS), share of revenues from crop production on overall agricultural 
revenues representing the farms’ production specialization (SPEC), participation in publicly 
beneficial activities such as road maintenance or transportation (PUBLBENACT), director’s 
subjective perception of the enterprise's economic situation (ECONSIT), size of the enterprise 
expressed in total annual working hours (SIZE), share of employed owners to total number of 
employees (WORKEROWN), directors' age (DIRAGE), average age of remaining managers 
(MANAGAGE), and directors education (DIREDUC). 
 
The characteristics of individual farms used for the analysis of the association 
membership choice are as follows: membership in the APF (ASSOC2MEM), employment of 
external workers (EXTWORK), performing non-agricultural activities in addition to 
agricultural production (NONAGRACT), farmer age (FARMERAGE) and education 
(FARMEREDUC), and using extension services (EXTSERVICE). Variables SPEC, 
PUBLBENACT, SIZE and ECONSIT are used and defined for individual farms analogically to 
the agricultural enterprises. It must be mentioned that the choice of variables is influenced by 
the preliminary correlation analysis of a larger spectrum of farms' characteristics, which is, 
due to spatial reasons not described in this paper. The described variables are chosen 
uncorrelated variables. The description of the variables is completed by more information and 
statistics in Table 1. 
 
The data from the second data source, the farm accountancy data network, are used 
for the analysis of the technical efficiency effect of the association membership. The data is 
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cost data is available for production factors, thus no breakdown between quantity and prices is 
possible. To keep the indication of output quantity and input equipment comparable over time, 
the cost data expressed in value terms were transformed to a constant price basis. Price indices 
for agricultural output and inputs were used to bring the revenues and cost data to the constant 
terms of 2001. Due to an incomplete data panel and some missing information in the 
qualitative survey on association membership, the final used sample includes 157 agricultural 
enterprises and 57 individual farms for 2001, 163 agricultural enterprises and 62 individual 
farms for 2002, and 154 agricultural enterprises and 58 individual farms for 2003. 
 
TABLE 1  Descriptive Statistics of Analyzed 2004 Survey Data 
Variables (SFA 
notation) 
Mean Min  Max  Description  (frequencies) 
Individual farms 
ASSOC2MEM (z1
1)  0.32  0  1  Yes  = 1 (32%), No = 0 (68%) 
SPEC (z2
1) 0.58  0.18  1   
NONAGRACT (z3
1)  0.35  0  1  Yes = 1 (35%); No = 0 (65%) 
FARMERAGE (z4
1)  48 27 71   
FARMEREDUC (z5
1)  1.92  1  3  High school = 1 (32%), high school with state 
exam = 2 (45%), college = 3 (23%) 
EXTSERVICE (z6
1)  2.18  1  4  Yes, frequently = 4 (17%); not frequently/not 
rarely = 3 (21%), rarely =2 (25%), no = 1 
(37%) 
SIZE (z7
1) 5.55  1.80  15.83  Thousand  hours 
EXTWORK  0.32  0  1  Yes = 1 (32%); No = 0 (68%) 
ECONSIT   3.75  1  5  Good = 5 (37%), 4 (25%), 3 (23%), 2 (7%), 
very bad = 1 (8%) 
PUBLBENACT  2.58  1  4  Very frequently = 4 (18%), frequently = 3 
(42%), exceptionally = 2 (20%), never = 1 
(20%)  
Agricultural Enterprises  
ASSOC1MEM (z1
2)  0.72  0  1  Yes  = 1 (72%), No = 0 (28%) 
COOPS (z2
2)  0.53  0  1  Coop = 1 (53%); Other legal form = 0 (47%) 
PUBLBENACT (z3
2)  0.77  0  1  Yes = 1 (77%); No = 0 (23%) 
DIRAGE (z4
2)  52 30 67   
MANAGAGE (z5
2)  48 35 58   
DIREDUC (z6
2)  2.62  1  3  High school = 1 (3%), high school with state 
exam = 2 (31%), college = 3 (66%) 
SIZE (z7
2) 158.42  14.01 645.27 Thousand  hours 
SPEC  0.51 0.12 0.89   
ECONSIT   3.86  1  6  Very good = 6 (3%), 5 (29%), 4 (31%), 3 
(25%), 2 (10%), very bad = 1 (2%) 
WORKEROWN  0.55 0.02 1.00   
 
TABLE 2  Descriptive Statistics of the Accountancy Data for 2001-2003 
Individual Farms    Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
Total annual revenues (1,000 
CZK)  y
1
2528.88 2460.82 215.13 16618.12
Labor (1,000 annual work. hours)  x1
1 5.55 2.95 1.80 15.83
Land (ha)  x2
1 118.53 142.65 13.00 882.89
Animals (livestock units)   x3
1 32.72 36.96 0.00 208.68
Capital (1,000CZK)  x4
1 380.57 690.83 2.86 6357.60
Variable inputs (1,000 CZK)  x5
1 2528.88 2460.82 215.13 16618.12
Agricultural enterprises     
Total annual revenues (1,000 
CZK)  y
2
69555.93 55771.12 2276.49 407541.00
Labor (1,000 annual work. hours)  x1
2 158.42 107.8 14.01 645.27
Land (ha)  x2
2 1724.75 1031.82 137.97 8846.00
  7Animals (livestock units)   x3
2 999.18 653.00 41.17 4147.48
Capital (1,000CZK)  x4
2 4765.78 3821.82 18.00 24446.75
Variable inputs (1,000 CZK)  x5
2 45845.55 36111.16 2662.30 206117.40
 
The variable total revenues consists of revenues from agricultural production and 
services, including intermediary, store change and loss compensation from insurance, 
revenues from non-agricultural production and services and subsidies for country-side 
maintenance. Only in the case of labor use, land use, and animals is quantitative information 
on total annual working hours, cultivated hectares, and livestock units, respectively, available. 
Capital is expressed in asset depreciations without the depreciation of animal herds. Variable 
inputs consist of materials for agricultural production such as fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, 
etc., and energy, services, materials for non-agricultural production, use of own intermediary 
and others. Cost data on land rent, social contributions and labor costs, and interest were 
subtracted from the cost variables. 
 
 
5  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
To understand the effect of the newly evolving associations in transition on their 
members’ efficiency, not only must we measure farm specific efficiency and its relationship to 
association membership, but we must also analyze which costs and benefits the associations 
provide, as well as the main characteristics of the farms that choose the associations' 
membership. We use secondary literature, expert interviews and a questionnaire survey to 
analyze the associations’ activities; a portion of these results were provided in the description 
of the Czech agricultural associations in Section 3. Further, we use the statistics from the 
structured questionnaire for a descriptive analysis of the motives for membership and degree 
of satisfaction with the association's activities. 
 
The farm's choice of association membership is a traditional binomial discrete choice 
problem. The models which are able to recognize a choice situation in which individuals must 
decide among discrete, qualitative alternatives are so-called qualitative response models. Their 
common trait is that their dependent variables take only discrete values and the independent 
variables determine the probability of an individual of choosing one alternative from a choice 
set. The researcher can only state the probability of a decision-maker selecting an alternative, 
but will never be able to predict the decision. Therefore, the probability choice theory has 
been developed to capture the effects unobserved by the researcher (McFadden 1981). All 
qualitative response models obtain the values of the parameters of the assumed choice-
influencing factors by deriving a function for the choice probability. They thus calculate the 
probability that an individual or a firm will make a discrete choice from a set of alternatives 
given the assumed explanatory variables. The explanatory variables assumed to influence the 
association membership choice are listed in Table 1. For almost all qualitative response 
models, the appropriate estimator is the Maximum Likelihood estimator. There are a number 
of different types of qualitative response models that apply in different situations; the number 
of alternatives in our case implies that we specify a binomial choice model. We further 
distinguish the qualitative response models based on the assumption we make on the 
probability function of the choice, which depends on a vector of independent variables and a 
vector of unknown parameters. If the distribution is assumed to be standard normal, we speak 
about a Probit model, and if it is logistic, we estimate a Logit model (Greene 2000). In the 
binomial case, the question of which distribution to use is unresolved; they mostly provide 
similar results (Greene 2000). Only Probit model estimates will be presented in this study. 
 
The measurement of the firm level production efficiency is methodologically more 
complex. In this study, we concentrate on estimating technical efficiency which can be 
estimated by a number of parametric and non-parametric approaches. We use a parametric 
stochastic frontier approach that allows us to simultaneously estimate the parameters of the 
production function and the parameters containing information on the effects of determinants, 
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allows one-step analysis of the frontier and inefficiency determinants, it is more consistent 
when compared to alternative two-stage approaches. When analyzing agricultural productions, 
random deviations and outliers can significantly affect the estimates of firm-specific technical 
inefficiencies. The stochastic nature of the parametric approach makes the estimates less 
sensitive to these outliers and random effects. To use this approach, however, requires 
assuming the functional form of the production function, the inefficiency model and 
distribution of random effects. We first estimate the more general translog case and test this 
specification for possible simplification. 
 
We apply the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier production function 
specification, where technical inefficiency effects are explicitly expressed as a function of a 
vector of firm-specific variables and random error, and integrated in the stochastic frontier 
model. It is an extension of the first parametric frontier model independently proposed by 
Aigner et al., (1977), Battese and Corra (1977), and Meusen and van den Broeck (1977), who 
added a random error to the general parametric deterministic production function with an 
inefficiency effect defined by Aigner and Chu (1968). The Battese and Coelli (1995) 
specification for cross-sectional data can be expressed as follows: 
 
(1)  () i i i i u v x Y − + = β ln ,   i = 1,2,…, N.   
 
where ln(Yi) is the logarithm of the (scalar) output for the i–th firm; xiβ denotes the production 
possibility frontier; xi is a (k+1)-row vector whose first element is “1”, and the remaining 
elements are the logarithms of the k-input quantities of the i–th firm; β is a (k+1)-column 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; vi accounts for random error and “white noise” 
(measurement errors and other random factors such as the effects of weather, strikes, luck, 
etc.); and ui is a non-negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency in the 
production of firm i. Having a composed error term requires distributional assumptions for 
both the white noise and the technical inefficiency error term because only the composed error 
term  ei = vi – ui can be estimated. The variables vi are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal random variables with a mean of zero and constant 
variance σv
2 independent of the ui. The systematic deviations from the frontier ui are assumed 
to be i.i.d. truncated random variables with a mean of µit and constant variance of σu
2, 
independently distributed from vi. The mean µi of the distribution of ui is firm-specific and can 
be defined as follows: 
 
(2)  δ µ i i z =   
 
where zi denotes a (p×1) vector of firm-specific variables which may influence the efficiency 
of the i-th firm, whose values are fixed constants; and δ is an (1×p) vector of parameters to be 
estimated. Individual firm TE can be defined by the following equation: 
 
(3)     ) exp( u TEit − =
 
The parameters of the frontier production function and the inefficiency model are 
obtained by the maximization of a relevant likelihood function (see Battese and Coelli 1993). 
We use the software package FRONTIER 4.1, which includes the estimation algorithm of this 
model. We estimate separate models for individual farms and agricultural enterprises, thus 
assume significantly different shapes of production surfaces and inefficiency effects between 
the two farm groups. Still, pooling, in other words the possibility of identical technologies 
between individual farms and agricultural enterprises, will be tested for. We further assume 
that the shape of production surface is identical for association members and non-members, 
however, we allow for its parallel shift between these groups. The same neutral shift 
assumption is made for technological change since only three sequential years are analyzed. 
As mentioned in the data section, only unbalanced panel is available. Due to this and to time 
pooling, we treat the model as cross-sectional for 174 individual farms and 453 agricultural 
  9enterprises, separately. The concrete production frontier model specification has a translog 
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where yi
f represents the total revenues for the i-th enterprise
 in farm group f (f = 1, 2 for 
individual farms and agricultural enterprises, respectively, i = 1, 2,…, N
f, where N is the total 
number of observations over the years 2001-2003; N
1 = 174 for individual farms sample and 
N
2 = 453 for agricultural enterprises sample); xji is the j-th input (j = 1,..,5) of the i-th 
enterprise presented in Table 2; β , υ, and ω are parameters to be estimated; pti is a time 
dummy variable (t = 1,2, for 2002 and 2003, respectively) which allows for neutral technical 
change; z1i is a dummy variable for association membership which should capture in the 
production frontier the production possibility differences between association members and 
non-members. Both ui and vi are random variables which represent technical inefficiencies and 
statistical noise, respectively, as defined earlier. The specific form of the technical 
inefficiency effect model is defined as follows: 
 


















i p z ϖ δ δ µ
 
where  µi, is the farm i-specific mean of a truncated normal distribution of technical 
inefficiency, δ and ϖ are parameters to be estimated; pti and indices, i and t, are as defined 
earlier; zn is the n-th independent variable of the i-th farm expected to determine the level of 
technical inefficiency in t-th time period (n = 1,…,7), where zn represents slightly different 
variables in the individual farms and agricultural enterprises models. The zn variables are 
concretely defined in Table 1 and the text above. 
 
 
6  RESULTS 
 
 
Both groups of farms, agricultural enterprises and individual farms, rank similarly the 
importance of various incentives for the association membership. The most important 
incentive for membership in both associations is political lobbying for agriculture and their 
group. An interesting finding was that this incentive, which can be a subject to free riding by 
non–members, is still the most important affiliation motive for most members. The second 
most important incentive for both groups is the advisory and consultancy activity of the 
association, i.e., its information services, lectures and seminars, which represents the selective 
incentives only available to the members. For the individual farmers, the same important is the 
informal exchange of opinions between farmers and processors, followed by the prospect of 
indirect economic income from farmers' exchanges and a group effect on prices, services, the 
certainty of production realization, etc.  
 



















A) Enforcement and shield for farmers' 
interests at the political level (including 
negotiations with the EU) 
56% / 63% 35% / 21% 3% / 8%  5% / 8%  3.44 / 3.38
B) Help and shield agr. producers' 
economic interests (price increases, 
investment, input supply cooperation)  
23% / 24% 50% / 36% 21% / 24%  6% / 16%  2.89 / 2.68
  10C) Advisory and consultancy, 
information service, lectures and 
seminars.  
30% / 40% 52% / 36% 14% / 12%  4% / 12%  3.08 / 3.04
D) Entrepreneurial and expert missions 
abroad  4% / 17% 9% / 0%  32% / 21%  55% / 63%  1.62 / 1.71
E) Functioning Court of Arbitration  2% / 0%  10% / 4% 20% / 25%  67% / 71%  1.48 / 1.33
F) Public activities and popularization of 
agriculture  21% / 21% 47% / 33% 18% / 17%  14% / 29%  2.76 / 2.46
G) Indirect economic income (prices, 
services, certainty of realization of 
production, etc.) 
17% / 46% 43% / 17% 26% / 21%  13% / 17%  2.64 / 2.92
H) Possibility of informal opinion 
exchange (chats) between farmers and 
processors 
25% / 40% 46% / 32% 20% / 20%  9% / 8%  2.88 / 3.04
Note: The first number denotes answers given by agricultural enterprises, while the second number 
denotes answers provided by individual farmers 
    
For large-scale enterprises, the assertion of agricultural producers' economic interests 
such as price improvement and stabilization, or investment support, is more important than the 
above-mentioned membership incentive for individual farmers. However, using the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test of two independent groups, statistically significant differences 
in the incentives among the two farm groups were found only with respect to the support of 
collective forms of entrepreneurship viewed as important by agricultural enterprises (versus 
support of the private form of entrepreneurship preferred by individual farms) and the 
incentive to informally exchange knowledge and experience with others in the group, which is 
asserted as more motivating by individual farmers. 
 
Individual farmers are, in general, slightly more satisfied with the activity of the APF 
than the agricultural enterprises are with the AA. Both groups of farms are more satisfied with 
the provision of advisory and consultancy activities, information services, lectures and 
seminars than they are with the political lobbying activity of either association. Individual 
farmers more positively value the informal exchange function of the association than do 
agricultural enterprises, which could imply the APF's stronger social role among individual 
farmers and their stronger social capital. This corresponds with the fact that the membership 
base of the APF is significantly smaller. 
 
The estimates of the qualitative response models presented in Table 4 disclosed that 
there are not many characteristics which distinguish farms members from non- farm members 
in either of the farm groups. As the different nature of the individual farms and agricultural 
enterprises suggests, different factors play a role in the membership choice between these two 
farm groups. The probability of an individual farm choosing an APF membership is 
significantly higher if the farm employs external workers and is thus less traditional in the 
family farming sense of the word. There is also a significantly lower probability that an 
individual farm will choose membership if it is more concerned with the community and the 
farm’s role and possible contribution to it. Therefore, members in an APF can be expected to 
be farms less socially, but more commercially concerned. Size is not included in the model for 
individual farms since it correlates with the variable external worker employment, 
EXTWORK. A model tested with the size variable without EXTWORK, however, did not 
confirm size as a significant factor increasing the probability of APF membership choice. 
Nevertheless, this could be a consequence of the sample construction, which excluded farms 
cultivating less than 10 hectares since they are very rarely APF members.   
 
The discrete choice analysis of the agricultural enterprises' membership choice in AA 
provided a different picture. Factors significantly influencing the probability of AA entry 
relate to ownership structure of the enterprise and its production specialization. The Probit 
model parameters suggest that the higher the share of workers who are simultaneously owners 
of the enterprise, the higher the probability of AA membership. As Curtiss et al., (2004) in 
their study of ownership development in Czech agriculture found, employee ownership is 
  11characteristic for less transformed and reorganized enterprises; the ownership tendencies are 
towards ownership concentration. In the context of the present study, this suggests that firms 
which are more similar to their pre-reform form are more likely to be grouped in the AA with 
many historical ties than are more reformed enterprises. These could also be enterprises which 
are motivated by the opportunity of political lobbying for large-scale and collectively-owned 
firms in agriculture, which received only little political support, especially at the beginning of 
the political reforms in the early 90s. Another significant indicator of higher probability of AA 
membership choice is higher specialization in more technologically complex livestock 
production. This is given by the negative parameter of the variable SPEC, which stands for the 
share of crop production of total agricultural revenues. This could imply the farm's perception 
of the importance and positive effect of the selective incentives in the form of consultancy, 
information provision, seminars, etc., for more technological, progress-demanding 
technologies.   
 
The stochastic frontier analysis results utilized to identify the farm efficiency effect of 
associations membership are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. First, the models are tested for 
their specification. To examine the nature of the technology used by individual farms and 
agricultural enterprises, we test the differences in the conditional mean of the production 
frontier, as well as in the error structure, including the inefficiency effect between these two 
farm groups. The first test presented in Table 5 indicates that the null hypothesis of equal 
technologies, and thus a pooled model for both farm groups is rejected. Therefore, we 
estimate and further test for the correct specification of the two separate models - for 
individual farms and agricultural enterprises.
  12TABLE  4  Probit Model Results for the Probability of Agricultural Association 
Membership Choice using 2004 Czech Survey Data 
Individual farms  
– APF membership 
Agricultural enterprises  
– AA membership 
Explanatory variable  Parameter  P value  Explanatory 
variable Parameter P  value 
Constant  1.591 0.280  Constant  -5.259 0.021 
SPEC  -0.421 0.618  SPEC  -2.016* 0.073 
ECONSIT  0.149 0.350  ECONSIT  0.152 0.284 
PUBLBENACT  -0.387** 0.050  PUBLBENACT  0.142 0.677 
FARMERAGE  -0.025 0.200  DIRAGE  0.029 0.165 
FARMEREDU  -0.136 0.587  DIREDUC  0.438 0.121 
NONAGRACT  -0.234 0.590  MANAGAGE  0.048 0.156 
EXTWORK  0.853** 0.042  WORKEROWN  1.645*** 0.004 
EXTSERVICE  -0.105 0.544  SIZE  0.000 0.123 
 COOPS  0.363 0.249 
Log (likelihood)  -32.166  Log (likelihood)  -47.984   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 
The first test applied to the model for individual farms implies that restrictions on the 
general translog form are rejected. This indicates that the simplification of a Cobb-Douglas 
function is rejected and production elasticities vary significantly over the surface of the 
production possibilities set. The same is true for the model specification for agricultural 
enterprises. Also here, the translog functional form is more suitable for the enterprises’ 
technology description. The last presented test regards the joint effect of variables chosen for 
the explanation of the farm-specific technical inefficiency conditional mean. We find that 
technical inefficiency varies significantly across farms in both models. Therefore, assuming 
technical inefficiency and its farm-specific character among Czech farms is relevant. 
 
TABLE 5  Results of Hypotheses Testing 




Pooled model vs individual models 
for individual farms (IF) and 
agricultural enterprises (AE)  
β0IF=β0AE ;  βjkIF=βjkAE ; ωtIF= 
ωtAE ;δ0IF=δ0AE ; δnIF=δnAE; ϖtIF= 
ϖtAE ; σIF= σAE ; γIF= γAE
119.912*** 40.289 
(33.924) 
Test on stochastic production frontier for individual farms 
Cobb-Douglas function 
simplification  
βjk = 0;  j = k = 1,…,5.  62.436*** 30.578 
(24.996) 
Significance of inefficiency factors   δ1 = …= δ7 = ϖ1 = ϖ2 = 0  25.001*** 21.666 
(16.919) 
Test on stochastic production frontier for agricultural enterprises 
Cobb-Douglas function 
simplification 
βjk = 0;  j = k = 1,…,5.  37.512*** 30.578 
(24.996) 
Significance of inefficiency factors   δ1 = …= δ7 = ϖ1 = ϖ2 = 0  42.701*** 21.666 
(16.919) 
*, **, and *** indicate the significance of the effect at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively.  
 
The stochastic frontier production model estimates for both farm groups are presented 
in Table 7. Estimating the translog production frontier function often results in less significant 
first- and second-order effects. This is also the case with our estimates. Therefore, partial 
effects of the individual inputs on the production frontier are interpreted using the partial 
output elasticities reported in Table 6. These are calculated from the estimates with 
approximation to zero for each farm in the sample and averaged for analyzed groups of farms. 
The partial elasticities represent the first order effects from the estimated frontier, which in 
their sum give scale elasticities. All output elasticities, aside from elasticity with respect to 
land in the model for agricultural enterprises, are positive, which implies an increase in output 
  13if input use increases. The negative output elasticity with respect to land could be caused by 
the fact that larger enterprises in the sample have a larger share of livestock production in their 
total revenues. Most elasticities, including the negative ones, are, however, not significantly 
different from zero. Variable inputs, which comprise seeds, chemicals and fertilizers, have the 
most important and significant effect for revenues. The scale elasticities’ close to the value of 
one imply that each group of enterprises, associations members or non-members, produce 
with constant returns to scale. Their production extent is thus, on average, suitable for the 
existing technologies in the group of individual farms and agricultural enterprises.   
 
TABLE 6  Group-specific Partial Output, Scale Elasticities and Technical Efficiencies 
  Individual farms  Agricultural Enterprises 
  Non-member  APF member  Non-member  AA member 
  Elasticity  St. dev. Elasticity St. dev. Elasticity St. dev.  Elasticity  St. dev.
Labor   0.023 0.204 0.003 0.163 0.065 0.082 0.094 0.043
Land   0.161 0.237 0.139 0.254 -0.014 0.059  -0.017 0.058
Animals  0.004 0.024 0.008 0.022 0.104 0.087 0.066 0.045
Capital   0.169 0.136 0.113 0.150 0.034 0.048 0.051 0.024
Variable inputs   0.660 0.317 0.735 0.269 0.811 0.070 0.784 0.060
Scale  1.017 0.104 0.997 0.115 1.000 0.046 0.978 0.040
Technical 
efficiency  0.801 0.154 0.888 0.097 0.869 0.121 0.896 0.098
 
The technical efficiency scores in Table 6 show diverse results. First, the average 
technical efficiency scores for individual farms are lower than for agricultural enterprises, 
which in separate models does not imply that individual farms are on average less productive 
than agricultural enterprises, but indicates that there are larger performance differences among 
individual farms than among agricultural enterprises. Furthermore, farms not affiliated with 
either association are less technically efficient than members. Parameters δ1
1 and δ1
2
 in Table 7 
imply that this efficiency difference between members and non-members is significant at the 
1% significance level in both groups. The size of the parameter also implies that membership 
in APF decreases the farm's inefficiency more than membership in AA, which could be 
partially given by the larger performance heterogeneity among the individual farms.  
 
However, as the insignificance of the parameter υ, again in both models shows, 
association membership does not shift the production possibility surface and thus does not 
necessarily provide conditions and information which would not be achievable without 
affiliation in the association. Because of the large heterogeneity in technical efficiency among 
non-members, only the best non-members can achieve the production potential, which is 
closer to most association members. As the other parameters in the inefficiency effect model 
show, the more efficient farms closer to the production potential could have various 
characteristics. Among individual farms, larger farms, specialized more towards livestock 
production, less diversified into non-agricultural activities, and younger or more educated 
farmers are more likely to achieve the same production potential with the best farms affiliated 
with AA. Factors which, besides AA membership, significantly improve technical efficiency 
among agricultural enterprises are: director’s and management’s higher age, which correlates 
with more years of experience, director’s higher education, less investment in publicly 
beneficial activities, also, surprisingly, cooperative form of farming, which could in the 
transitional conditions represent a higher level of trust between owners. 
 
The time development of technical efficiency provides another interesting difference 
between the individual farms and agricultural enterprises. Individual farms positively shift the 
production potential over years, however, the differences in the farms' performance remain the 
same. On the other hand, the significant negative effect of time dummies in the technical 
inefficiency effect model and insignificant shift of the production frontier over time among 
agricultural enterprises implies that these enterprises already achieved a high technological 
level in 2001, which provided space for the enterprises to decrease performance differences 
over the following years. 
  14TABLE 7  Estimates of the Translog Stochastic Frontier Production Functions 
Production frontier    Individual farms (f = 1)  Agricultural enterprises (f =2)
  Parameter Stand. dev. Parameter  Stand. dev.
    β0 3.471** 1.266 -0.978 1.226
Labor   x1 β1 -0.076 0.423 -0.209 0.415
Land   x2 β2 0.631 0.451 -0.188 0.472
Animals  x3 β3 0.042 0.095 0.835** 0.390
Capital   x4 β4 -0.497 0.348 0.016 0.249
Variable inputs   x5 β5 0.490 0.425 1.112** 0.361
 x 1
2 β11 -0.070 0.055 0.043 0.030
  x2
2 β22 -0.093** 0.043 0.032 0.045
  x3
2 β33 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.020
  x4
2 β44 -0.015 0.012 0.013* 0.007
  x5
2 β55 0.119* 0.073 -0.073* 0.045
 x 1 x2 β12 -0.065 0.079 -0.119* 0.064
 x 1 x3 β13 -0.002 0.014 -0.043 0.050
 x 1 x4 β14 0.235** 0.061 0.020 0.048
 x 1 x5 β15 0.027 0.098 0.030 0.063
 x 2 x3 β23 -0.019 0.015 0.026 0.046
 x 2 x4 β24 0.226** 0.057 -0.062 0.047
 x 2 x5 β25 -0.035 0.102 0.135* 0.069
 x 3 x4 β34 -0.010* 0.005 -0.031 0.032
 x 3 x5 β35 0.017 0.016 -0.045 0.057
  x4 x5 β45 -0.305** 0.076 0.024 0.040
Time dummy 2002  t1 ω1 0.048 0.050 -0.009 0.019
Time dummy 2003 t 2 ω2 0.087* 0.054 -0.020 0.019
ASSOCMEM q  υ  -0.030 0.053 -0.027 0.019
Inefficiency Effect – Individual farms  Parameter Stand. dev.























Time dummy 2002  t1
1 ϖ1
1 -0.029 0.138
















Log (likelihood)  35.223  
Inefficiency Effect – Agricultural Enterprises  Parameter Stand.  dev.























Time dummy 2002  t1
2 ϖ1
2 -2.519** 0.790
















Log (likelihood)  266.182 
  157  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This paper provides (a) an empirical analysis of firms associations’ affiliation – what 
motivates firms to become a business group member and what type of firms decide for 
association membership – and (b) an analysis of the effect of associations’ affiliation on firms’ 
performance. We use the case of Czech agriculture, where the dual farm structure with a 
strong large-scale farms faction and small individual farms faction generated the need for two 
independent business groups which would communicate their needs and interests to the 
government and the public. The two main Czech agricultural associations, the Agrarian 
Association, which represents agricultural enterprises, and the Association of Private Farming, 
a gathering that serves individual farms, are the subject of the study. We utilize data from a 
structured questionnaire survey conducted in 2004, and accountancy data for the same farms 
from the years 2001 to 2003. 
 
  Analyzing incentives for association membership disclosed that neither group of 
association members are motivated by purely rational concerns. Both groups of farms - 
agricultural enterprises, as well as individual farms - view political lobbying by their 
respective association as the most important incentive despite the fact that it can become a 
subject of free riding by non-members. The second most important incentive for membership 
is activities such as consultancy, seminars, information provision, or training provided purely 
to association members. The members are also the most satisfied with these selective incentive 
activities, which are expected to contribute to the members' economic performance. The 
difference between the two associations' members groups concern their interest in a large-
scale or collective versus an individual private form of farming. Individual farms also place a 
higher value on the  informal exchange of knowledge and experience with others in the group, 
which suggests this groups’ higher social capital. 
 
  The results of who chooses association membership imply that different farm 
characteristics are decisive for AA and APF membership. More commercial, individual farms 
that employ external workers and farms less concerned with contributions to the community 
are more likely to choose affiliation with APF. For AA membership, the ownership structure 
of the enterprise and its production specialization are more decisive. Agricultural enterprises 
that have a higher degree of employee ownership are more likely to choose AA membership 
than farms which reorganized and concentrated their ownership. Also, higher specialization in 
more technologically complex livestock production increases the probability of choosing AA 
membership. This could imply the farms' perception of the importance and positive effect of 
some AA activities such as consultancy, information provision, seminars, etc., for more 
technological progress-demanding technologies. 
 
Technical efficiency results suggest that becoming a member of either association, 
AA or APF, is a way of improving economic performance. Farms affiliated with agricultural 
associations are more homogeneous in their performance and as a group lie closer to the 
production possibility set than non-members. The effect of association membership is larger 
for individual farms. This could be given by the larger performance differences among the 
individual farms we observe in the case of agricultural enterprises. However, it is not only AA 
or APF members that establish the production potential. There are other farm characteristics 
besides association membership which ascribe a higher probability of reaching the production 
frontier. Among the individual farms, technical efficiency is higher on farms led by younger 
or more educated farmers. Also, farm size, livestock specialization and less diversified 
production are factors that improve technical efficiency of individual farms. On the other 
hand, older directors and management with more experience are significantly more technically 
efficient when leading agricultural enterprises. Similar to individual farms, a director’s higher 
education positively influences enterprise performance; also, less investment in publicly 
beneficial activities and cooperative forms of farming related to higher levels of trust between 
owners were found to determine a higher level of technical efficiency among agricultural 
enterprises.    
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NOTES 
 
1 The first two researchers are post-doctoral fellows at the Institute of Agricultural 
Development in Central and Eastern Europe, Halle (Salle), Germany. The third author is a 
researcher at the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Prague, Czech Republic. The 
authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Marie Curie 
Development Host Fellowship of the European Commission, the Frauenstiftung, and the 
National Agency for Agricultural Economics of the Czech Republic. Paper presented at the 
EAAE Seminar on Institutional Units in Agriculture, held in Wye, UK, April 9-10, 2005. 
 
2 Free-riding is a situation commonly arising in public goods contexts in which 
players may benefit from the actions of others without contributing themselves. Thus, each 
person has incentive to allow others to pay for the public good and not personally contribute.  
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